Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin
Issue 26 - April 2001

Editor: Joseph Hanlon
Published by AWEPA


 
Talks break down as Renamo
insists it won 1999 election

"Our premise is that Renamo won the 1999 election with 52% of the legislative vote and 60% of the presidential vote. Frelimo falsified the result and Renamo does not recognise Chissano or his government. If Chissano wants stability, he must satisfy Renamo´s demands. Otherwise, there will be many troubles," declared David Aloni, effectively number two in Renamo. Aloni was speaking to the Bulletin after Renamo President Afonso Dhlakama walked out of the third round of talks with Mozambique President Joaquim Chissano on 29 March.

Speaking at a press conference the next day, Dhlakama said: "Since the beginning of the talks, the principal issue has been clear: the appointment of governors nominated by Renamo-UE in zones where we won the elections, or alternatively, early elections."

There is no international or diplomatic support for Renamo claims of election fraud. There were problems, particularly caused by a very large number of errors made by polling station staff in their report forms. But the consensus of observers from the Carter Centre, European Union, and this Bulletin was that the election was well run and that votes from disputed or excluded polling stations could not have changed the outcome. The inter-national view is that Joaquim Chissano is the legitimately elected president of Mozambique.

But the result was relatively close, 52% for Chissano and 48% for Dhlakama. Renamo and Frelimo came under heavy pressure, both internally and internationally, to talk and come to some accord which would give Renamo and Dhlakama a greater role, even though there is no provision for this in the constitution.

Early last year, Frelimo even offered Renamo the chance to name short-lists for some governorships (see below "Missed opportunities 1"), but this was rejected by Dhlakama who stuck to his all-or-nothing position - the right to name governors, not just short-lists, and in all six provinces.

Chissano and moderate wings in both parties support negotiation and felt progress was being made. But it seems that the hard-liners in both parties are in the ascendance, and Dhlakama is now making demands that Chissano cannot possibly meet.

 
Three meetings between the Presidents

Afonso Dhlakama and Joaquim Chissano met three times in the new parliamentary office building. For the first meeting on 20 December, Dhlakama tabled a series of demands:

  • Recount of the 1999 presidential vote.
  • "Immediate abolition of the judicial system because it is rotten and strongly party-based."
  • Equal representation and treatment of Renamo in the army, police, riot police, and security police.
  • Renamo-UE to name governors, district administrators, and heads of posts in the provinces where it had a majority in the 1999 elections.
  • Analysis of a government decree (15/2000) calling for increased involvement of traditional authorities and community leaders.
  • "Dismantling party structures in the state apparatus."
  • Release of people detained in connection with 9 November demonstrations.

Both sides agreed that the first meeting was friendly and went well. It included a one-to-one session between the two leaders, and some demands, such as for the abolition of the judicial system, were toned down. There was an agreed joint statement.

President Chissano agreed "to take immediate action to resolve possible discriminatory treatment in the armed forces".

And he made one major concession - in future, if posts of governor or district administrator fall vacant, Renamo will at least be consulted before a person is chosen for the post.

The second meeting on 17 January was very different, and was difficult, tense and confrontational. There was no one-to-one meeting. Each side said that the other side had changed completely after hard-liners had objected to the conciliatory tone of the first meeting and had forced their presidents to take a stronger stand. Dhlakama continued to claim that Chissano's position was illegitimate, and Chissano offered no further concessions to Dhlakama´s demands. Bulletin interviews confirm that both sides took harder positions.

Nevertheless, at Dhlakama's request, the second meeting set up a series of three working groups, on public administration, judicial and constitutional reform, and defence and security. Later two more were added, on the economy and on the media. It was agreed that the two leaders would meet again before the end of March.

The next meeting was on 29 March and was again tense, with larger teams of eight people on each side. After five hours of talks, Dhlakama walked out, handing Chissano an already written letter breaking off the talks.

 
Both sides agree on the
cause of the breakdown

What was notable about the press briefings the next day is that the two sides agree almost completely on what happened on 29 March. Both sides agree that the working groups, in Dhlakama´s words, did "good work". The constitutional working group had eight meetings and produced an agreed report. In their statements both Chissano and Dhlakama said that the constitutional working group report made two points:

  • The President of the Republic has discretionary powers which include the right to name and dismiss governors as he sees fit, but
  • If appointment of governors is to be linked in any way to the vote at provincial level, then this requires a constitutional amendment.

Both sides agree that Dhlakama demanded that the President use his powers to appoint Renamo nominees as governors in six provinces, and that if he refused to do so, then he should propose the appropriate constitutional amendment urgently to parliament in this session. Both sides agree that Chissano refused to remove six governors and replace them with Renamo nominees, and also refused to move an urgent constitutional amendment, saying that this should be part of the ongoing constitutional reform discussion in parliament.

Finally, both sides also agree that a central sticking point is that Dhlakama wants negotiations between the two main parties, and he sees this as rooted in the 1992 peace accord. "We have to reach agreement with the Frelimo party, and not with the government," Dhlakama told the press conference. Chissano insists that this is a dialogue between the government and the opposition and that the peace accord period ended with the 1994 elections; Renamo is the official opposition, but it no longer has a special standing as a former armed movement.

This difference has coloured the talks from the beginning. Chissano´s team is mainly ministers (although it did include a member of the Frelimo Political Committee who is not a minister), and Chissano appointed ministers to head his teams in the working groups, stressing the view that his side is government. Dhlakama specifically complained about the use of ministers instead of senior party figures, reflecting his claim that the government is illegitimate. Similarly, Dhlakama repeatedly says he wants a political agreement on broad outlines, for example of constitutional changes, to be agreed by the two party leaders and imposed through party discipline on the party benches in parliament. Chissano, for his part, refuses to do this, and wants to move as many issues as possible over to parliament for debate.

Dhlakama wants Chissano to use powers they both agree he has to satisfy Renamo demands, while Chissano says he refuses to act as a dictator.

 
Hard and soft lines

Both Renamo and Frelimo have a spectrum of opinion on negotiation. On the Frelimo side, President Joaquim Chissano, as a former diplomat, seems inclined to talk, and has the backing of many of his ministers. But a majority of the senior party leadership and many in parliament are opposed to talks and concessions. Frelimo parliamentary leaders have publicly objected to the two presidents having talks over the heads of an elected body and bypassing it.

Leading figures in Renamo are also opposed to making concessions and push Dhlakama to stick to impossible demands. Others, particularly in the small parties in the Renamo-UE coalition, would prefer serious negotiations.

Thus, at present, those who see the Dhlakama-Chissano talks as a power struggle are dominating the process, pushing aside those who see a place for genuine political negotiations.

Carlos Cardoso, the assassinated editor of Metical, argued shortly before his death that there were factions within both parties who wanted violence and tension. Some of the old military people in Frelimo want to provoke Renamo into violence, so that the law and police power can be used to crack down on them. And some of the old military people in Renamo feel they have not gained their promised rewards from peace and parliamentary democracy.

Máximo Dias, Secretary-general of Monamo and a Renamo-UE MP, told the Bulletin: "Renamo says people want to occupy power through noise and demonstrations. But this will only lead to a state of emergency and will be used by Frelimo to end elections. Some in Frelimo want this, and some idiots in Renamo fall into this trap."
 


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